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PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: A 
MYSTERIOUS ALCHEMY 
Michael D. Schattman* 
PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM 
RoosEVELT THROUGH REAGAN. By Sheldon Goldman. New Ha­
ven: Yale University Press. 1997. Pp. xv, 428. $45. 
Each filling of a judicial vacancy is a minidrama of individual ambi­
tions, backstage maneuverings, mobilization of support, and occa­
sional double-dealing, and is affected by the values of those involved 
in the process. There is human drama as political forces, events and 
personalities intersect. And the end result is the staffing of the third 
branch of government, which by its actions - or inactions - has a 
profound effect on American lives. [p. 365; footnote omitted] 
With these words, Professor Goldman1 concludes the lesson he be­
gan nine chapters earlier as he embarked on his exploration of the 
seldom-mapped territory where the American government sets 
about building that smallest part of itself that has the most day-to­
day continual contact with the American people. But I would hope 
that the readers of this review and of this book would keep that 
simple lesson uppermost in Inind as they consider Sheldon 
Goldman's unique contribution to our understanding of ourselves. 
INTRODUCTION 
I have twice been nominated to the federal bench by President 
Clinton. The first nomination, in December 1995, lapsed at the end 
of the 104th Congress. I was renominated in March 1997. I have 
never had a hearing and never had a letter from the Senate Judici­
ary Cominittee requesting additional information. In 1995 and 
again in 1997 the White House precleared my noinination with my 
two home-state Republican senators. Originally; I was noininated 
before the scheduled retirement date of the judge I was named to 
replace, which gives knowledgeable readers an idea of the lack of 
controversy surrounding my appointment. I had strong bipartisan 
support. In July of 1997, however, almost two years to the day after 
* Currently in private practice with Hill, Gillstrap, P.C., Arlington, Texas, Chicago, Illi­
nois, and Little Rock, Arkansas. Judge, Tarrant County Court at Law No. 2, 1979-1983; 
Judge, 348th Judicial District of Texas, 1983-1996. Nominated December 1995, to U.S. Dis­
trict Court, Northern District of Texas. A.B. 1968, Georgetown; J.D. 1971, University of 
Texas.-Ed. 
1. Professor of Political Science, University of Massachusetts at Amherst. 
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I was first recommended to the President by the Texas congres­
sional delegation, my affirmative blue slips were suddenly with­
drawn by the Texas senators.2 
For those readers who have no idea what withdrawal of blue 
slips means, I recommend perusing Sheldon Goldman's Picking 
Federal Judges: Lower Court Selection from Roosevelt Through 
Reagan. It should be read by every lawyer who wants to be a fed­
eral judge as well as by those who practice in front of them. Much 
of its importance resonates in the current political atmosphere and 
can be seen in the increased attention given to presidential nomina­
tions, judicial or otherwise, in both the popular press and legal 
academia. This is due in part to the personal peccadilloes of the 
nominees - consider, for example, former Senator John Tower's 
lifestyle, which was so criticized by his fellow Republicans, or Zoe 
Baird's failure to pay social security on domestic help despite two 
large professional incomes. The nominee becomes a caricature of a 
social problem and an object lesson for the public. 
It is also important to a growing understanding of the role these 
once-anonymous persons play in the life of the Republic and in the 
lives of each of us. This latter realization may account for the 
proliferation of scholarly articles devoted to the nomination process 
that have appeared in the last few years.3 These articles, however, 
are not likely to be read widely even in legal circles. Goldman's 
book provides information to lawyers, judges, the press, and the 
general public in an anecdotal format and with an astounding 
2. See Neil A. Lewis, Jilted Texas Judge Takes on His Foes in Partisan Congress, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 16, 1997, at 1; Henry Weinstein, Drive Seeks to Block Clinton Judicial Nominees, 
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1997, at A3. These articles discuss the political nature of the stall placed 
upon President Clinton's nominees and efforts by right-wing groups to involve Republican 
senators in their fundraising projects by linking them to blocking federal judicial 
nominations. 
3. Some articles of interest include: Richard S. Arnold, Judicial Politics Under President 
Washington, 38 Aruz. L. REv. 473 (1996); Kim Dayton, Judicial Vacancies and Delay in the 
Federal Courts: An Empirical Evaluation, 61 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 757 (1993); John M. de 
Figueiredo & Emerson H. Tiller, Congressional Control of the Courts: A Theoretical and 
Empirical Analysis of Expansion of the Federal Judiciary, 39 J.L. & EcoN. 435 (1996); 
Sheldon Goldman, The Bush Imprint on the Judiciary: Carrying on a Tradition, 74 JUDICA­
TURE 294 (1991); Orrin G. Hatch, The Politics of Picking Judges, 6 J.L. & PoL. 35 (1989); 
Laura E. Little, Loyalty, Gratitude, and the Federal Judiciary, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 699 (1995); 
R. Samuel Paz, Federal District Court Nomination Process: Smears of Controversy and Ideo­
logical Sentinels, 28 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 903 (1995); Wm. Bradford Reynolds, The Confirma­
tion Process: Too Much Advice and Too Little Consent, 15 JUDICATURE 80 (1991); 
Christopher E. Smith & Thomas R. Hensley, Unfulfilled Aspirations: The Court-Packing Ef­
forts of Presidents Reagan and Bush, 51 ALB. L. REv. 1111 (1994); Carl Tobias, Filling the 
Federal Courts in an Election Year, 49 SMU L. REv. 309 (1996); Carl Tobias, Rethinking 
Federal Judicial Selection, 1993 BYU L. REv. 1257; Oona A. Hathaway, The Politics of the 
Confirmation Process, 106 YALE L.J. 235 (1996) (book review); Orrin G. Hatch, Making a 
Real Mess, 1995 PUB. INTEREST L. REv. 139 (book review); Gary A. Hengstler, At the Seat of 
Power, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1995, at 70; Elena Kagan, Confirmation Messes, Old and New, 62 U. 
Cm. L. REv. 919 (1995) (book review); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Straightening Out Tue Con­
firmation Mess, 105 YALE LJ 549 (1995) (book review). 
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amount of insider detail - including handwritten notes between 
presidents and their confidants.4 He spends little time on well­
covered Supreme Court nominations, concentrating as his subtitle 
says on lower court selection. 
Goldman's book is a work of political science, and it is short on 
the historical context that would be useful to interpret the tables 
located throughout the text. In fact, it does not tell you nearly 
enough about blue slips.5 But it certainly will allow you to refute 
the common misconception that the politicization of nominations 
started with Judge Bork. 
I wish to settle that bit of historical inaccuracy first: politiciza­
tion of the process of selecting federal judges has been around for a 
long time. Less than two years after Truman became president 
upon the death of Roosevelt, the Republicans gained control of the 
Congress. Wisconsin Senator Alexander Wiley headed the Senate 
Judiciary Committee. According to Goldman, Senator Wiley an­
nounced even before he assumed the chairmanship that the Senate 
worild confirm no "leftists" (p. 81). Soon after, he stated he wanted 
a political balance in appointments-that is, more Republicans. 
Next, he proclaimed his opposition to any New Dealers. His com­
mittee held up nominations and the number of confirmations began 
to drop: sixteen in 1946 when the Democrats were in control, ten in 
1947 under the party opposite the president, and in 1948, anticipat­
ing President Dewey, the total confirmed by the Republican­
controlled Senate dropped to three (p. 81). 
I cannot say, for this is not a history book, whether this strategy 
led to the appellation "do-nothing Congress" and the triumph of 
Harry Truman. It was, however, nearly fifty years before the coun­
try chose again to have a Democratic President paired with a Re­
publican Senate. It is somewhat surprising, given the previous 
results, that the Republican leadership would resurrect Senator 
4. In filling a vacancy on the Third Circuit, Roosevelt wrote at the bottom of a memo 
recommending one candidate named Jones, "Guffey backing MM," indicating Senator 
Guffey's endorsement of a different candidate, Musmanno. Roosevelt then turned around 
and, after applying personal charm and pressure, appointed a third man who did not want the 
judgeship but who was the President's choice. P. 28. 
5. The blue slip was the extra-constitutional administrative convenience adopted early in 
the Eisenhower presidency as a way for home-state senators to indicate their support of or 
opposition to a nomination. It gives the committee chair a way to be advised in a nonpublic 
manner of the private views of a colleague. The blue slip only has the force the committee 
chair is willing to give to it, although there have been attempts to give it greater effect by 
resolutions of party conferences in the Senate. It is not to be confused with a "hold," which 
is a sort of secret club blackball that allows any senator to block a vote on a nominee from 
any state for any office for any reason or no reason by simply advising the majority leader 
that s/he desires to hold the nomination. Both practices have been criticized. See, e.g., 
HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JumcIAL PROCESS 23-24 (6th ed. 1993); GEORGE C. EDWARDS III 
& STEPHEN J. WAYNE, PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP: PoLmcs AND POLICY MAKING (4th ed. 
1997). 
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Wiley's old playbook. Yet here we are today, hearing almost the 
same words and watching the same damming up of the process. 
Contrast this approach to Goldman's account of the Demo­
cratic-controlled Senate's approach to President Nixon's judicial 
nominees as impeachment and resignation loomed. As August 
1974 began, only one of Nixon's judicial appointees remained pend­
ing. Then, on August 8, his last full day in office, Richard Nixon 
nominated three more judges. All four of his final nominees were 
confirmed (p. 226). 
As Professor Goldman makes obvious to the diligent reader, 
there is no need for Wiley-like behavior.6 This system designed by 
our Founding Fathers is so evenly balanced that by 1961, after 
twenty years of Roosevelt-Truman followed by only eight years of 
Eisenhower, the federal judiciary was evenly split between Demo­
crat and Republican office holders (p. 157). This is despite the fact 
that the Senate had a Democratic majority for twenty-two of those 
twenty-eight years, including the final four opposite Eisenhower. It 
is an excellent example of letting the political market take its course 
without deliberate interference. Individual candidates should be 
reviewed on the merits. That is what the Constitution demands and 
expects. Those who would deliberately interfere with the process in 
order to limit the total output are selfish and reckless. They ru:e 
selfish because deliberate interference is a bullying tactic adopted 
by sore losers that says in effect: you won but you can't have the 
prize. They are reckless on two bases. On a narrow basis, this strat­
egy led the Republicans to defeat in 1948. On a wider basis, it in­
terferes with the natural pendulum swing of free ideas which has 
protected our nation from the upheavals so common in other 
democracies. 
6. We are experiencing this mindless partisan resistance once again and it is hurting the 
selection process and crippling the courts. In his year-end report, Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist noted how these partisan divisions and the Senate's inordinate delay in acting on 
nominations were leaving the judiciary shorthanded. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 1997 YEAR­
END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (Jan. 1, 1998). The news media has responded to 
the harm caused by this delay and focused on the federal courts' productivity as at no other 
time. One article noted that in 1990, retired judges handled 3049, or 14.6% of the 20,836 
federal trials. By 1997, the total number of trials was down to 17,266 yet trials presided over 
by the senior federal judges had risen to 3524 (or 20.4 % ). Pekkanen & Gill, Judicial Vacan­
cies Force Delays Create Case Backlog, THE DETROIT NEws, Feb. 8, 1998, at AS. In the U.S. 
Senate, Vermont Senator Patrick Leahy (D) has responded by introducing the "Judicial 
Emergency Responsibility Act," which would prevent lengthy Senate recesses and require 
the Senate to act on judicial nominations within 60 days during any declared judicial emer­
gency. S. 1906, 105th Cong. (1998). 
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A state without the means of some change is without the means of its 
conservation. 
- Edmund Burke7 
PERSPECTIVE 
The best way to approach this book is to use the same roadmap 
as Professor Goldman - the successive presidential administra­
tions that have introduced judicial nominees to the Senate and the 
people. He does so in nine chapters, with the first giving a general 
overview from 1789 to 1933. Seven chapters follow analyzing the 
selection process and criteria by each administration from 
Roosevelt to Reagan (Kennedy and Johnson are considered in one 
chapter, as are Nixon and Ford). The final chapter reprises what 
has gone before and then, for scholars or the incurably curious, a 
concise note on the sources available to most anyone, and finally 
forty-two pages of excellent detailed notes. I shall follow the same 
route and take the chapters and presidents in order. 
While the opening chapter in Goldman's book is entitled "Judi­
cial Selection in Theoretical and Historical Perspective," it is really 
more a description of his personal framework for reading a presi­
dent's mind. He describes three presidential agendas: policy, parti­
san, and personal (p. 3). The policy agenda is "the substantive 
policy goals of an administration." The partisan agenda is 
Goldman's shorthand for the use of power "to shore up political 
support for the president or for the party." Finally, the chief execu­
tive's personal agenda is not surprisingly defined as his use of "dis­
cretion to favor a personal friend or associate." From time to time 
in later passages the author reminds the reader of these concepts as 
he discusses the making or unmaking of a particular nomination or 
how one agenda was served by another. The problem with the 
agenda concept is that some presidents delegated this job almost 
completely. Furthermore, the relative value Goldman places on 
these distinctions is apparently low since there is no chart referenc­
ing or cross-referencing this information. It appears sporadically in 
the text and not in the final summations. 
Goldman uses historical perspective to mean a summary of the 
period between the Constitutional Convention and Herbert Hoover 
- that is, the time prior to the start of Goldman's research. Per­
haps because I majored in history and have made it a lifelong pas­
sion, I craved historical perspective. It is difficult to determine 
what any president was thinking, policy versus party interests, if you 
cannot put decisions into the context of the issues of the times and 
7. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QuoTATIONS 111 (3d ed. 1979). 
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the place. If this book is ever updated it ought to be coauthored by 
a historian. 
ROOSEVELT 
Franklin Roosevelt's meticulous attention to the slightest detail 
and his apparent delight in manipulating the pieces on the chess­
board are the hallmarks of his selection of judges for the federal 
bench. If the author's agenda analysis is helpful at all, it is perhaps 
most helpful here in appreciating Roosevelt's understanding of how 
the three tracks can be used all the time. FDR was quick to see that 
the old men on the Supreme Court could prevent the reforms he 
had conceived to rescue the nation from depression and revolution. 
He was quick to see a solution and to push it despite the cautions 
from his close advisers. When public opposition forced the Con­
gress to reject his court-packing plan, Roosevelt quickly adapted. 
The natural attrition of death and retirement soon allowed his nom­
inees to become members of the Nine. In tum he directed his at­
tention to the lower courts and their impact on his policies. 
Although the author does not discuss the question, it may be 
that FDR's experience as a governor of a state with a judiciary that 
was entirely elected helped to inform his approach to picking 
judges. He understood the nuances of filling vacancies and satisfy­
ing the patronage needs of an individual senator from his New York 
experience. But here on the larger stage he saw a broader picture 
and sought nominees who would help fill out the canvas. Conse­
quently, as Goldman makes clear, he took an active role in looking 
for and screening the nominees sent to him. FDR understood that 
senators had both partisan and personal agendas that he could use 
to his advantage. Still, he was cautious. While he attempted to 
meet the needs of specific New Deal constituencies such as minori­
ties and women, he did not act so precipitately that he alienated 
another part of the coalition, whether southern senators or city 
bosses, on a specific nomination. Numerically, he succeeded in 
placing the first woman on a federal court of general jurisdiction -
Florence Allen on the Sixth Circuit - and the first black on a fed­
eral district bench - William Hastie in the Virgin Islands (pp. 51-
57). Roosevelt found that his discretion was circumscribed by the 
Senate as well as by his own desire to achieve his other broader 
policy goals. 
TRUMAN 
Coming into the presidency as he did, Harry Truman carried on 
where Roosevelt left off. This is true of his judicial appointments as 
well. If there was a honeymoon for the man who found himself 
facing Stalin at Potsdam and making the decision to drop the 
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atomic bomb, it was not in the area of picking judges. In office for 
a week, he was visited by the senators from North Carolina to dis­
cuss judgeships in that state (p. 68). 
More a political figure than a national one like Roosevelt, the 
former senator was more deferential to the wants and desires of 
senators - even Republican senators - than his predecessor. Yet 
he came to understand the prerogatives of his new office and to 
guard them stubbornly if need be. Like Roosevelt, Truman worked 
through his Attorney General and the Democratic National Com­
mittee chair on judicial appointments. Unlike Roosevelt, Truman 
was more of a hands-off president and rarely attempted to 
micromanage the process of finding, selecting, vetting, appointing, 
and confirming his judges (p. 69). He did pay close attention to 
what happened in his home state of Missouri even as its political 
leaders and its senators worked names through the system. 
Truman's appreciation for patronage and party building seems 
to have smoothed much of his appointment road, but there were 
some exceptions. In Georgia, Truman elevated the brother of Sena­
tor Russell to the Fifth Circuit, but then he and the Senator dis­
agreed over the brother's successor. Finally, after a long fight the 
two men met and Truman agreed to Russell's choice (pp. 71-72). In 
Vermont, Truman fought and won a behind-the-scenes battle with 
the Vermont Democratic Party leadership to name a Republican 
and former senator to a federal district court in that state (p. 69). 
The Vermont Democrats were focusing on party building and 
Truman on naming a man he knew and respected, regardless of 
party. 
An intra-party fight among California's Democrats illustrates 
the problem of state-by-state selection that drove President Carter 
years later to try to rationalize and systematize the process on a 
national basis. Party factions in California were at loggerheads on 
potential nominees for two district court vacancies. The party or­
ganization had its choices and the state's senior senator had his 
own. Stalemate set in for over a year and each attempt by Truman 
to make peace ended in failure, if not renewed acrimony. Finally, 
illness forced the senator's retirement and Truman was able to 
make his own choice - one from each faction (pp. 72-73). 
With the Republican victory in the 1946 congressional elections, 
Truman faced a hostile Senate and a Republican majority confident 
that the president was irrelevant. The result was the program of 
Senator Wiley mentioned above - no leftists, no New Dealers, 
more Republicans and in the end almost no confirmations (p. 81). 
Determined to block the appointment of women and blacks, Sena­
tor Wiley brought the American Bar Association into the process to 
screen and give its evaluation of nominees - previously the func-
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tion of the Justice Department and the FBI (pp. 86-88). Wiley's 
plan worked. Even after Truman's victory in 1948, the ABA's par­
ticipation ensured that by the end of his term he had named only 
one woman, Burnita Matthews of Mississippi backed by Senators 
Eastland and Stennis, to the federal district court. He also elevated 
William Hastie to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (pp. 
96-97, 100-01). 
On the public policy front, Truman carried to completion the 
legislative programs of the New Deal and began civil rights initia­
tives, but this seems unconnected to his judicial appointments, 
where he focused on accommodating individual senators. Or was it 
unconnected? Truman's number of appointments of Catholics and 
Jews to the federal judiciary was many times that of Roosevelt, re­
flecting their importance in the ruling Democratic coalition (pp. 
107-08). The picture emerges of a president more conscious than 
his predecessor of the impact judicial appointments have on other 
policy choices made by the legislative branch, but more confident of 
his ability to understand and influence those choices without 
micromanagement that would cost him both legislative support and 
his nominees. 
EISENHOWER 
Not surprisingly, the management style of a president who had 
grown up in the electoral rough-and-tumble of western Missouri 
politics was different from that of his successor. Dwight 
Eisenhower had spent a lifetime in the command structure of a pro­
fessional army and was noted for understanding the impact of logis­
tics on victory. Both Harry and Ike got along well with 
subordinates - few other presidents radiate that comfortable feel­
ing of first-name familiarity - and were students of persons and 
personalities. But each demonstrated an approach to picking 
judges that resembled his own management style. Truman's sit­
down-and-deal gave way to Eisenhower's by-the-book. But Eisen­
hower understood that there was both a governmental and political 
purpose to this exercise. 
When Eisenhower took office after twenty years of Roosevelt 
and Truman, the judiciary was 77.5% Democratic appointees (p. 
112). This level of imbalance would not be matched until Clinton 
succeeded twelve years of Presidents Reagan and Bush. 8 A former 
military man, at first the new president liked judicial nominations to 
go through channels. But realizing their dual governmental and 
political purpose, he soon directed that judicial nominations be 
cleared through the Republican National Committee. As time went 
8. Goldman, supra note 3, at 299. 
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on and he learned more about the process, he instructed the Attor­
ney General to put him in the decisionmaking loop (p. 113). But 
Eisenhower became dissatisfied with even this approach as he felt 
that he needed to be involved before the final decision was made. 
He called for closer consultation with the Justice Department ear­
lier in the process. Goldman does not say it, but you come away 
with the feeling that Eisenhower was impelled to have the same 
influence on who moved up in the judiciary as senior commanders 
have on the development of the officer corps. It also seems clear 
that he wanted some flexibility so that he could deal with the 
Senate. 
These suppositions may account for how the use of the ABA 
became institutionalized under Eisenhower (p. 137). What better 
way to build in the firmness of command structure, yet preserve for 
the commander the option of selecting a candidate not of a sena­
tor's choosing, than to bring in an institution akin to the Army's 
personnel boards? Eisenhower, having directed an Allied coalition, 
had an understanding of coalition politics. While the Senate was 
Republican during his first two years, Eisenhower then had to deal 
with a coalition of southern Democrats and Republicans from 1954 
until 1958, when an economic downturn prompted the election of 
seventeen new Democratic senators, including many liberals (p. 
110). Eisenhower's Justice Department was aggressive in giving its 
commander-in-chief the :flexibility of choice he desired even if it 
meant stepping on the toes of GOP Senators. Republican minority 
leader Everett Dirksen held up and even killed Eisenhower nomi­
nations if he felt that Republican senators were not given their due. 
Democratic majority leader Johnson once briefly held up all action 
on nominations until the Republican National Committee included 
one candidate desired by Johnson on the list of nominees.9 
Goldman misses some opportunities in this section. Although 
he notes Ike's interest in appointing Catholics as tied to party­
building (p. 116) he does not consider that side of Eisenhower's 
persona as a master of coalition management that made this a natu­
ral decision for the military man now come to politics.10 While the 
appointment of William Brennan is presented with some context 
and detail, the appointment of California Governor Earl Warren as 
Chief Justice just nine months into Eisenhower's term is just stated 
and passed over without discussion (p. 109-10). There is no consid­
eration of the political motives or how it impacted Eisenhower's 
relation to the Senate in making selections for the lower courts. 
9. Pp. 133-34. Contrast this to Senator Wiley's demand for half the benches in 1946, 
discussed above. 
10. This may account for his appointment of William Brennan to the Supreme Court.•P. 
152. 
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This may have been outside the author's scope, but it is something 
to pause and think about. Finally, although the "blue slip" was in­
vented in the Eisenhower era, there is no mention of it in this 
chapter.11 
In May 1958, after five years in office, Eisenhower expressed 
uncertainty about the proper role of courts in a democracy. He sent 
Attorney General William Rogers a lengthy memo asking probing 
questions about the courts, legislation by the courts versus decision 
making, the federal-state relationship, and the limits to Congress's 
control over the courts (p. 125). Rogers responded with a compre­
hensive seven-page, single-spaced letter explaining the proper role 
of the courts in reviewing legislation, the use of phrases such as 
"due process" and "equal protection" in our constitutional frame­
work, the use of judicial legislating both as an accurate and as an 
oversimplified criticism, and the need for the judiciary, despite the 
occasional error, to be independent so that the integrity of the deci­
sional process could be maintained (pp. 125-26). This remarkable 
exchange reflects well on both Eisenhower and Rogers as they tried 
to come to a common understanding so that the man who led the 
free world would know what one third of his government was 
about. 
This same concern led Eisenhower to inquire about the propri­
ety of a recess appointment.12 Upon being assured by his Attorney 
General that the power could be properly exercised, he did so with 
dispatch (pp. 119-20). In choosing his judges Eisenhower displayed 
a remarkable lack of ideology. One of his appointees, Judge John 
Minor Wisdom, described Eisenhower's style in recruiting and 
screening judges as follows: "There is no cataloguing of biases or 
prejudices . . . . Instead, what is of concern is whether the man is a 
qualified lawyer, knowledgeable, has community standing and judi­
cial temperament" (p. 124). 
Eisenhower's record of appointments differed significantly from 
his predecessors. Over 70% of Ike's first-term judges came from 
private practice compared to 26% for Truman. In his second term, 
Eisenhower chose 56% from private practice. One third of the first 
group and one-half of the second came from medium-to-large firms, 
including many prominent firms. By contrast, none of Truman's 
first-term appointees came from such firms. Ike appointed no law 
professors and, unlike Truman and Roosevelt, no sitting member of 
Congress. About 60% of his judges had records of prominent party 
activism (p. 151). However, perhaps because of the criteria men-
11. See ABRAHAM, supra note 5, at 23-24; EDWARDS & WAYNE, supra note 5, at 348. 
12. "The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the 
Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next 
Session." U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. 
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tioned by Judge Wisdom, none of Eisenhower's nominees was re­
jected by a vote of the full Senate (p. 152). 
KENNEDY 
While John Kennedy undoubtedly had an interest in judicial se­
lection there are no memos or notes that document his involvement 
(p. 158). It appears matters were handled by phone or at lunch with 
his brother, the Attorney General, and others with whom he had 
close ties. Robert Kennedy said that the President became actively 
involved only in about a half-dozen situations where members of 
Congress wanted someone other than the prospective nominee (p. 
159). Like Truman before him and Johnson afterward, Kennedy 
came from the Senate and senators of the President's party therefore 
exerted great influence over the selection process (p. 173). Profes­
sor Goldman states that no mention of a role for the DNC in judi­
cial selection is found in Kennedy's papers (p. 174). Kennedy 
continued to utilize the ABA in screening as had Eisenhower. 
However, when the ABA lobbied for bipartisan (half-and-half) se­
lection, Robert Kennedy thanked it for its evaluative role and 
stated that Republicans would be appointed but in no particular 
percentage (pp. 177-78). 
Although Kennedy faced a Congress dominated by conservative 
southern Democrats, he was just as cognizant as Truman and 
Eisenhower that one hand washes the other. Kennedy therefore 
appointed some Republicans, including three recess appointments 
left over from Eisenhower.13 His approach was to arrange pack­
ages with Democratic and Republican nominees to gain support 
across party lines. A total of eleven Republicans were named in the 
three years of the Kennedy Administration (p. 190). In compari­
son, only nine Democrats were named in Eisenhower's eight years 
(p. 148) and these were often southern "Eisenhower" Democrats 
(p. 151). 
Shortly after Kennedy took office, seventy-three new judgeships 
were created. In a presidential first, Kennedy pledged to appoint 
"[m]en and women of unquestioned ability."14 The majority of 
these appointees came from private law practice. Many were from 
large firms. Only 1.7% of Kennedy and Johnson nominees were 
solo practitioners although during those years 35 % of the nation's 
lawyers practiced solo (p. 193). Kennedy strove for quality appoint­
ments and largely succeeded (p. 196). In only one instance did 
Kennedy knowingly appoint a segregationist to a circuit court, and 
13. Two of these recess appointees were confirmed. The one not confirmed was JFK's 
only nominee to be defeated (p. 187 & n.hh) and he was subsequently nominated by Nixon 
and confirmed by a still-Democratic Senate (pp. 174-75). 
14. However, he only appointed one woman, Sarah Hughes of Texas. P. 180. 
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this was after a two-and-one-half-year fight over an Arkansas seat 
on the Eighth Circuit (p. 168). He did, however, appoint persons 
with public records of racist statements to district courts (p. 167). 
Overall ideological orientation was less important than whether 
segregationist positions would be taken from the bench (p. 170). 
Goldman's account of Kennedy's administration is weak in his 
treatment of Kennedy's use of recess appointments, which he used 
to put Thurgood Marshall on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. 
The device of a recess appointment apparently was intended to give 
some political cover to Judiciary Committee Chairman James 
Eastland of Mississippi, who, according to Robert Kennedy, 
delayed appointments but never caused any trouble (p. 183). There 
is a lot that is not said in this nonstatement of noninterference. The 
Kennedys and Eastland were not strangers to politics. If, as chair­
man, Senator Eastland was not causing trouble for a more diverse 
class of nominees, then what were the considerations given him in 
exchange? Goldman does not explore the subject. Given the 
Kennedy penchant for packaging nominees, it is just as easy to 
package other commodities - a dam or an air base or a highway 
bill for a judge. How these nonjudicial matters fit into the selection 
process should not be discounted. 
JOHNSON 
Like his mentor Roosevelt, former Senate majority leader 
Lyndon Johnson micromanaged judicial selection (p. 160). He ap­
pointed more law professors (five) than Truman, Eisenhower and 
Kennedy combined (p. 194). However, Goldman does not explore 
the reason behind this statistic. Was it a reflection of a Roosevel­
tian streak in LBJ, or his own career as a teacher, or attachments 
between these academics and Democratic politicians? We are left 
to wonder at its meaning. 
But we do not have to wonder at the meaning of one of 
Goldman's other observations. After the passage of civil rights leg­
islation, LBJ insisted on knowing the civil rights views of candidates 
for the judiciary (p. 170). Purely personal views were not a bar to 
appointment, however. Several judges were nominated over the 
objections of civil rights leaders (pp. 170-71). Local ABA commit­
tees frequently found these nominees to be well-qualified, and the 
backing of powerful southern senators whose votes were needed on 
other matters led to the usual dealmaking. On June 13, 1967, 
Johnson named Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall to the 
Supreme Court (p. 171 n.v). For the nation's black leaders this 
more than made up for his acceding to the requests of southern 
senators on other appointments. 
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In 1966, forty-five new judgeships were created and in 1968, 
nine new appeals court positions were established (p. 180). The ju­
diciary was expanding as the federal government's role in the life of 
the nation expanded and as the Congress put more responsibility on 
the courts in sustaining that role. This expansion gave the former 
Senate majority leader in the White House more pieces with which 
to play. He accommodated senators where he could on nomina­
tions and expected assistance in return on needed legislation.ts Us­
ing this approach, Johnson named nine more Republicans to the 
federal courts for a total of twenty in the Kennedy-Johnson era. 
This was more than twice the number of Democrats named in 
Eisenhower's two terms (p. 195) and reflects how the two senator­
presidents grasped the relationship between cooperation and 
legislation. 
Several runners-up for judgeships in the Kennedy-Johnson years 
were subsequently nominated by Nixon. Johnson had four nomina­
tions lapse at the end of his last Congress. He renominated all four 
after Nixon was elected in November in the belief that Nixon would 
defer to him in the same way that JFK deferred to Eisenhower. 
Nixon, however, withdrew the nominations. Nevertheless, of the 
four, one was again nominated by Nixon, another by Ford, and a 
third by Carter, and all were confirmed (pp. 187 n.hh). 
NIXON 
Richard Nixon, the first attorney to serve as President since 
Franklin Roosevelt, faced a Democratic Senate during his entire 
presidency. In 1968, opposed by Humphrey on the left and Wallace 
on the right, Nixon made a campaign promise to name strict con­
structionists to the courts (p. 198). Within a short time after his 
election he was able to replace Earl Warren with Warren Burger 
and to stage-manage the resignation of Abe Fortas from the 
Supreme Court (p. 198). Although the Fortas issue is barely 
touched in this book, the Fortas-Haynsworth-Carswell confirmation 
battles placed the Supreme Court nomination selection process 
squarely on the front burner of American politics, where it remains 
to this day. 
While Nixon seemed intensely interested in the political ramifi­
cations of Supreme Court appointments, he took little or no cogni­
zance of the lower federal courts and the impact that individual 
nominees would have on either the law or politics. Nixon was more 
concerned with issues of grand strategy in both global and domestic 
affairs and was bored by the details of implementation (p. 200). 
15. This approach can be readily seen in Johnson's working with Republican leader Sena­
tor Everett Dirksen to name judges Dirksen desired. P. 173. 
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Nominations for the lower federal courts were left up to the Attor­
ney General John Mitchell, the Justice Department and more par­
ticularly to John Ehrlichman, assistant to the President for domestic 
affairs (pp. 202-03). At the outset of his term Nixon gave the ABA 
a de facto veto over nominations by agreeing that no one would be 
nominated whom the ABA rated "not qualified" (p. 231). 
Goldman infers that Nixon and Mitchell - with their Wall Street 
experience - believed that the ABA shared their conservative Re­
publican values (pp. 214-15). 
There are two interesting aspects of Nixon's lower court selec­
tions. The first is that he named six African Americans to federal 
district court benches. While the politics involved in each individ­
ual nomination is fascinating; it is even more interesting to follow 
the memos of White House aides as they discuss how to broaden 
their appeal to blacks without damaging the Nixon "southern strat­
egy" (pp. 222-25). 
The second remarkable feature of Nixon's appointments is the 
lack of any concerted Democratic effort in the Senate to frustrate 
them. This could be seen most clearly as Nixon's presidency drew 
to its close. The House was readying to vote on articles of impeach­
ment and the Senate was preparing for the trial that would follow. 
Yet, as August 1974 opened, only one of Nixon's judicial appointees 
was awaiting action in the Senate Judiciary Committee. On August 
8, 1974, Richard Nixon nominated three more federal judges. The 
next day he resigned. All four of his remaining nominees (two dis­
trict judges and two appellate judges) were confirmed by a 
Democrat-dominated Senate (p. 226). 
FORD 
Perhaps because of the brevity of Ford's presidency, Goldman 
discusses his judicial nominations in tandem with Nixon's. This ap­
proach makes some sense. The demographics, personal back­
ground, and ABA and RNC involvement are similar. But it is 
appropriate to think of Ford's choices separately. From the begin­
ning, Ford attempted to make a break from the style and substance 
of Nixon's approach by changing the type of persons who made the 
screening and vetting decisions at the Justice Department. He tried 
to restore public faith in. a department once headed by the dis­
graced Mitchell and Kleindienst by bringing in Edward Levi of the 
University of Chicago as Attorney General and U.S. District Judge 
Harold Tyler as his deputy (p. 204). This difference in the leader­
ship at Justice may account for the fact that there was no change in 
the demographic background from Nixon to Ford appointees, but 
that there was a change in professional experience and party affilia­
tion. Ford relied much more heavily than Nixon on appointees who 
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came with previous judicial experience or from prosecutorial ranks. 
Likewise, and perhaps because of his legislative leadership experi­
ence, he was more open to the appointment of persons identified as 
Democrats than Nixon had been (pp. 204-05, 226-29). A number of 
the Democrats came with strong Republican senatorial support or 
as part of a package that included Republican nominees (p. 213). 
Nevertheless� Ford worked closely with party leaders on lower 
court nominations. Besides consulting with any affected Republi­
can senators, he routinely submitted names to the Republican Na­
tional Committee for clearance. Where there were no GOP 
senators, he consulted with the state party leaders and elected offi­
cials before acting on nominations (p. 212). His term was too brief 
for anyone to venture a guess as to Ford's management or person­
nel style with regard to judicial nominees. At the end of the Nixon­
Ford years, however, a judiciary consisting of 70% Democratic 
nominees in 1969 was more than half Republican when Jimmy 
Carter came to town (p. 235). 
CARTER 
For a nonlawyer, President Jimmy Carter displayed a remarka­
ble interest and involvement in judicial selection. It may have been 
his passion for reform and his engineer-driven desire for regular 
order or his tenure in the Georgia Senate and Statehouse. An op­
ponent of patronage, Carter pledged himself to the selection of 
judges based solely on professional qualifications (p. 238). Carter's 
interest lay in the process of selection more than the individuals 
selected. Carter was serious about removing patronage and to that 
end established a Circuit Judge Nominating Commission by execu­
tive order barely four weeks into his term (p. 238). The commission 
had a panel from each circuit. The panels had mixed membership 
of race and gender and were evenly divided between lawyers and 
nonlawyers. The order charged the panels with the task of giving 
the president the names of five qualified persons for a court of ap­
peals seat within sixty days of being notified of a vacancy. The 
President-elect and Attorney General-designate Griffin Bell had 
met with Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman James 0. Eastland 
in December to discuss changes in judicial selection. Eastland had 
tried to hold firm on senatorial prerogatives but had agreed to help 
Carter persuade senators to establish merit selection commissions 
in their states for district court appointments. He agreed to a nomi­
nating commission for the courts of appeal. Before this time only 
two states had such nominating commissions. By 1980 there would 
be thirty.16 
16. Pp. 244, 283. In the Reagan years the nominating commission was disbanded. Pp. 
290-91. 
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Carter's approach dramatically opened the process to scrutiny 
and eventually produced a broader spectrum of judges to include 
women and minorities and reduced the institutional influence of the 
ABA, while at the same time professionalizing the federal judiciary 
without undermining the quality of nominees by emphasizing nomi­
nees with proven judicial experience (pp. 276-81). Carter took a 
real interest in how the names came to his desk. The memos from 
White House counsel to the President and from the Attorney Gen­
eral to the President are annotated with handwritten comments by 
Carter. Some approve an arrangement. Others make subtle but 
significant changes in the order of the process, with the most signifi­
cant ones providing that names being considered will come to the 
President before going out for ABA and FBI checks (pp. 244-45). 
The most intriguing reading in the Carter chapter concerns the 
war between the White House staff and Attorney General Griffin 
Bell over who would control selection (pp. 246-49, 254-59). Bell 
fought unsuccessfully to keep that control entirely within his hands. 
Finally, an uneasy truce was made in which control was shared. 
Bell insisted, however, that only the White House counsel himself 
would have input and not his assistants. It would probably have 
been less contentious had the Attorney General recognized the 
very high priority the President had given to recruiting qualified 
women and minorities and had taken steps himself to implement 
that goal in the early months of the administration. When names of 
qualified minority and women nominees did not appear in the first 
year, Carter was heavily criticized in the press and by supporters. 
His staff reacted by wresting control from the Attorney General, 
whose performance they felt had subjected their chief to attack. 
Carter's great opportunity both to reform the process and to 
transform the makeup of the courts came from the Omnibus Judge­
ship Act of 1978 (pp. 241-44). Reflecting the increasing federal 
court docket and the federalization of much of the criminal law, 
Congress created 117 new federal trial judges and thirty-five new 
appellate judges. The numbers alone meant that there would be 
room both for senators and representatives to try to accommodate 
patronage needs and for the President to put minorities and women 
on the federal bench. 
Carter largely achieved his process-oriented objectiyes. True to 
his word on patronage, for example, he did not appoint any close 
friends to the bench. Goldman observes that Carter had no per­
sonal agenda and there is no evidence that he even suggested a pos­
sible judicial candidate for any vacancy (p. 260). As to party 
considerations, the Attorney General stopped references to a nomi­
nee's political affiliations in April 1978 and Carter himself never 
submitted any of his nominations to the Democratic National Com-
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mittee for clearance (p. 264). This measure of openness was re­
flected in the Senate where, beginning in 1979 with Senator 
Kennedy assuming the Judiciary Committee chairmanship, blue 
slips could no longer be used to block action on a nomination. 
Every nomination would be considered, and a home-state senator's 
dissatisfaction was now just another factor for the committee to 
consider (p. 263). Candidate Ronald Reagan promised to continue 
Carter's progress and to seek out women for appointment to the 
federal courts to achieve "a better balance" (p. 284). 
REAGAN 
Ronald Reagan, like Carter a former governor, was as detached 
from the selection process as Carter had been involved. But the 
Reagan Administration came to Washington with a firm grasp on 
its political ideology and its underlying belief system. This ideology 
would guide judicial appointments. Unlike the Carter administra­
tion, implementation under Reagan was not overseen by the Presi­
dent, but by Attorney General William French Smith, presidential 
counselor Edwin Meese III, and White House counsel Fred Field­
ing (pp. 286-91). They abolished the commission approach of the 
Carter years but insisted that three to five names be submitted to 
the White House for each vacancy to give them more flexibility (p. 
290). An Office of Legal Policy was created at the Justice Depart­
ment, hea<:led by an Assistant Attorney General. The office be­
came the clearinghouse for judicial nominations. A special counsel 
for judicial selection was also created. These officers, the AG, and 
the White House officials became the "Working Group on Ap­
pointments" chaired by Fielding. They institutionalized a formal 
and active role for the White House in the process (pp. 291-92). As 
in every administration before and since, they set about to appoint 
judges of like mind with the chief executive. 
Reagan's process differed from Carter's approach in two 
marked respects. First, otherwise qualified persons would not be 
considered unless they shared the administration's judicial philoso­
phy (p. 290). Second, the Reagan Administration abandoned the 
merit selection vehicles put in place, which were ironically similar 
to those Reagan himself had used as California's governor (pp. 287, 
289). 
The importance of the Working Group and its interview process 
(pp. 303-05) cannot be overemphasized. To a degree not seen 
before, Reagan turned the selection process over to these subordi­
nates and particularly to his longtime friend Ed Meese (pp. 291, 
299-302). The Working Group made judicial appointments a part 
of the president's domestic policy. Reagan made phone calls to 
those who were selected asking them to serve - a technique that 
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was not only flattering, but certain to reinforce to the appointee 
that he was a Reagan appointee (p. 294). 
There were several bumps on this road to staffing the courts. 
The most notable concerned the conflict between Reagan's cam­
paign commitment to appoint women and the desire of the conserv­
atives for ideological purity. Female appointees were automatically 
suspect because of equal rights and abortion issues. This conflict 
came to a head with the recommendation to appoint the general 
counsel of Hallmark, Judith Whittaker, as a federal judge in Mis­
souri (pp. 299, 320, 330-33). Whittaker had taken no position on 
abortion or other political issues, but she was thought to support 
the Equal Rights Amendment. Despite high marks from the ABA, 
the support of prominent Missouri Republicans, and her own GOP 
bona fides, her perceived support for the ERA was enough to fo­
ment a right-wing attack. Iowa Lieutenant Governor Terry 
Branstad and party activist and fundraiser Richard Viguerie labeled 
her a Democrat and pro-abortionist. The power of unfounded 
smears by attackers who did not know their victim was quickly ap­
parent. Meese led the Working Group to conclude that the 
Whittaker nomination should be dropped because she lacked, as a 
perplexed deputy attorney general explained, "broad-based sup­
port" (p. 333). 
Even with the Senate firmly in Republican hands, not all 
Reagan nominees were confirmed. Jefferson Sessions III was 
named to a federal bench in Alabama, but ran into trouble on civil 
rights issues; even after four hearings, the nomination could not be 
saved.17 
When Reagan's administration encountered opposition to a 
nomination it truly desired, it was willing to push. Two examples 
are the eventually successful fights to confirm Dan Manion to the 
Seventh Circuit and Alex Kozinski to the Ninth (pp. 309-14). In 
another unusual confirmation struggle with a Republican senator in 
a Republican-controlled Senate, the administration found its choice 
for the Eighth Circuit blocked by South Dakota's James Abdnor. 
Senator Abdnor was trying to end a twenty-two-year drought for 
his state on that court. Unable to persuade Abdnor, the Republi­
can leadership changed the rules in midsession so that a senator 
could no longer place a "hold" on a judicial nominee from another 
state (pp. 321-22). That change occurred in 1983. Today, the 
Republican-controlled Senate has gone back to its old custom al­
lowing cross-state blockage. 
17. Pp. 308·09. He is now a United States Senator and:a member of the committee that 
rejected him. The author does not tell us if this is a first, but in today's climate it may become 
an increasingly attractive option for unsuccessful nominees. 
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Reagan's efforts were remarkably successful in aiding him to 
reshape the lower federal courts. He appointed a record seventy­
eight appellate and 290 district judges. Like Carter he was helped 
by a judgeship bill that created eighty-five new judges and by a Sen­
ate that was in friendly hands for six of his eight years. Also like 
Carter he kept the ABA at arm's length and like Roosevelt he tried 
to make his judicial appointments an extension of his domestic pol­
icy. He was aided by a staff who understood this purpose and en­
thusiastically backed its implementation. Reagan, like FDR, 
wanted to reshape the courts not to reflect his vision but to share it 
and, like his onetime hero, he did it. But, like every president from 
Washington to Clinton and beyond, Reagan's success waxed and 
waned. Not simply because other presidents and Senates come af­
ter him, but because the thing that he leaves as a legacy - an in­
dependent judiciary ,- will itself change as the issues of each new 
day come before it and seek answers to questions previously 
unasked. 
CONCLUSION 
This is an eye-opening book about a process that has been in 
place virtually out of sight since the beginning of the Republic and 
which, on balance, has worked rather well. There seems to be a 
natural ebb and flow with the checks-and-balances-system of the 
framers preventing any party, no matter how long it dominates the 
executive or the legislative branches, from dominating the third 
branch. This will comfort those in either party who have feared 
otherwise. 
The system has worked well in modem times except for the 
breakdown in the Truman years and the analogous situation today 
to which Goldman alludes in his summing up (pp. 364-65). Both 
political reality and pressure from a citizenry that rejects the notion 
that the courts are merely another political branch have served to 
pl'.otect the judiciary from ideologues of the left and the right. The 
historical overview of the process also demonstrates the wisdom of 
a cardinal rule of practical politics, "Never create or assert an offi­
cial prerogative that could not be safely entrusted to your 
adversaries. "18 
Goldman has produced a comprehensive, well-organized and 
crisply written research work with excellent tables for any scholar 
or student of the American judiciary. It ends in 1988 and leaves the 
reader eager to know how Presidents Bush and Clinton handled 
18. Bruce Fein, The Chief Justice vs. Hatch, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1998, at A12. Bruce 
Fein was assistant attorney general in the Reagan administration. 
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judicial selection. I hope I will have the opportunity to review the 
sequel. 
I can just imagine how the book will start. Professor Goldman 
will refer to his previous book and the fact that it covered a span of 
fifty-five years and seven presidents. He will remark on the smooth 
transitions that occurred when two of these presidents died and a 
third resigned, each to be replaced by a man very different than the 
president the country had elected. He will say that for nearly two 
hundred years the process worked reasonably well. 
And then he must begin to write about the unprecedented crisis 
that we are only now beginning to understand. He will write about 
a group of men who, having had the unfettered power to select fed­
eral judges during the Reagan years, tried to cling to that power 
during the Bush years. Further frustrated by the election of Clin­
ton, they viewed the-1994 election of the Republican senate as their 
private restoration to presidential power. In what may one day 
prove to be the biggest constitutional scandal of the Clinton era, 
this unprecedented shadow government of former Republican offi­
cials appears to have conspired with current officeholders to disrupt 
the entire judicial nomination process. In short, they were captured 
for posterity on their own videotape trading blackballs for 
contributions.19 
The book may have a footnote about the nominee who exposed 
the shocking tape. It will be interesting to leam ·what became of 
him. 
19. See Judicial Selection Monitoring Project, videotape and prospectus accompanying 
letter from Robert H. Bork, Sept. 9, 1997 (on file with author)(representing contributions to 
JSMP as tax-deductible); Judical Selection Monitoring Project, Memorandum of Commit­
ment to Paul Weyrich (same) (on file with author). See also Weinstein, supra note 2. 
